CLAT PG 2025 Question Paper (SET A) Available: Download Solutions and Answer Key pdf

Ongwen was found guilty of 61 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, torture, enslavement, forced marriage, rape, and conscription of children under the age of 15 into armed groups. The ICC’s judgment emphasized the importance of accountability for leaders who exploit children in conflicts and commit sexual and gender-based crimes. A critical aspect of the judgment was the consideration of Ongwen’s own history as a child soldier. Ongwen was abducted by the LRA at around the age of nine and was forced to commit atrocities as he rose through the ranks. The court balanced this background against the gravity of his crimes, ultimately ruling that his personal history did not absolve him of responsibility for his actions as an adult commander. The judgment is also notable for its comprehensive approach to reparations for victims. The ICC ordered collective reparations, including symbolic measures like memorials, physical and psychological rehabilitation, and financial compensation to support the victims and their communities. This case reinforces the ICC’s commitment to addressing serious international crimes, particularly those involving vulnerable populations such as children and women and underscores the principles of justice and reparation in international criminal law.

Prior to this case, the definition of ‘industry’ had been subject to varied interpretations, leading to confusion and inconsistency in its application. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, broadly defined ‘industry’ to include any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture, or calling of employers and any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. However, this expansive definition left room for ambiguity, especially concerning statutory bodies and non-profit organizations.
In this case, the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board argued that it was not an industry, emphasizing its statutory duties and public welfare objectives. The Board contended that its primary purpose was to provide essential services, not to engage in profit-making activities typical of private enterprises. On the other hand, the respondents, including A. Rajappa, argued that the Board’s activities fell within the scope of an industry as defined by the Act, and thus, its employees should be entitled to the benefits and protections accorded to workers in industries.
The Supreme Court, in its judgment, undertook a comprehensive analysis of the term ‘industry.’ The bench, led by Chief Justice M. Hameedullah Beg, laid down a broad and inclusive definition of ‘industry.’ The Court asserted that what mattered was the nature of the activity and the relationship between the employer and the employees. This interpretation aimed to ensure that a wide range of workers, including those employed in public utility services, statutory bodies, and even some non-profit organizations, would be covered under the protective umbrella of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The decision in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa & Others had far-reaching implications. It extended the scope of labour protections to a broader spectrum of workers, ensuring that more employees could benefit from the dispute resolution mechanisms and other safeguards provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. This judgment underscored the judiciary’s role in interpreting labour laws to promote social justice and protect workers’ rights in a rapidly industrializing nation.

(1) The principle must be expounded so that it can be generally applied, ensuring the "internal morality" of legal principles. This reflects the idea of a government of laws rather than individuals.
(2) Mandates of the law must be communicated to the people affected by them.
(3) Newly announced laws should generally be applied prospectively, avoiding retroactive changes unless compelling circumstances exist.
(4) Legal standards should be clearly stated, though absolute clarity may not always be possible. Enforcement bodies may clarify laws as needed.
(5) Fuller argues for consistency in the body of law, minimizing contradictions.
(6) Laws must avoid imposing impossible or absurd demands, as these violate the internal morality of law.
(7) Consistency with prior norms (stare decisis) is desirable to prevent frequent, disruptive changes in legal requirements.
(8) As Andrew Jackson highlighted, laws must include means for implementation to ensure their practical enforceability.

SEBI’s powers to regulate the securities market include delegated legislative, administrative, and adjudicatory powers to enforce its regulations. SEBI exercises its legislative powers by framing regulations and updating them to adapt to the dynamic securities market. Numerous SEBI regulations form the backbone of India’s securities framework.

Section 11 of the SEBI Act states that SEBI’s duty is to protect investors’ interests, promote the development of the securities market, and regulate it through measures deemed fit. Section 30 empowers SEBI to make regulations consistent with the Act. During the regulation-framing process, SEBI consults advisory committees comprising domain experts, market players, legal experts, technologists, retired judges, academicians, and industry representatives. Public comments are invited and considered during this consultative process. SEBI adopts similar consultative processes for reviewing and amending regulations, ensuring a participatory approach to securities market governance.

Justice Vivian Bose observed that Section 106 is not meant to shift the burden of proof in criminal cases entirely onto the accused but addresses specific scenarios where the prosecution cannot reasonably prove facts uniquely within the accused's knowledge. In Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer, the court clarified that the section does not imply that the accused must prove their innocence, as this would contradict foundational legal principles.

The term "especially" in Section 106 highlights facts exclusively within the accused's knowledge. Misinterpreting this section to shift the general burden of proof would lead to startling legal conclusions, such as requiring the accused to prove they did not commit a crime. Privy Council cases, including Attygalle v. The King (1936) and Seneviratne v. R (1936), reinforce this interpretation. In circumstantial evidence cases, an accused's failure to provide a reasonable explanation under Section 106 may serve as an additional link in establishing guilt.

The Court clarified that rights under a contract can generally be assigned unless the contract is personal in nature or assignment is restricted by law or agreement. Conversely, obligations cannot be assigned without the consent of the promisee. Such consent leads to novation, effectively substituting liabilities.

This principle was emphasized in Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) (P) Ltd. (1962), where the Supreme Court drew a distinction between the assignment of rights and obligations. It observed that rights under a contract are typically assignable, provided the contract's nature or explicit terms do not prohibit it. Obligations, however, require the promisee's approval for reassignment, highlighting the collaborative aspect of contractual obligations.

These principles underscore the balance between the assignability of rights and the sanctity of mutual consent in obligations, ensuring that contracts remain fair and equitable.

The concept of double taxation means taxing the same subject matter twice when it should only be taxed once. GST law does not support such an imposition, and the importer, deemed a recipient under the reverse charge mechanism, cannot be held liable for tax on a service they have not directly availed.

The reverse charge mechanism is intended to simplify tax collection by shifting the liability from the service provider to the recipient, especially when the provider is located outside India. Extending its scope to include importers in this case stretches its purpose and lacks legislative backing.

Additionally, the constitutional framework mandates that taxes be levied with proper legislative competence without infringing on fundamental rights. The imposition of IGST on ocean freight without appropriate legislative support undermines key taxation principles enshrined in the Constitution.

For an agreement to qualify as a mortgage by conditional sale, it must include an ostensible sale with transfer of possession and ownership, along with a clause for reconveyance as per Section 58(c). The court clarified that a sale with a condition of retransfer is not a mortgage and is evidenced by separate documents.

Key factors include the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship, property valuation, transaction value, and stipulated time for reconveyance. The execution of a separate agreement for reconveyance militates against the agreement being a mortgage by conditional sale.

The judgment in Prakash (Dead) By LR v. G. Aradhya Ors (2023 SC) emphasizes that determining the nature of an agreement requires cumulative consideration of the agreement's language, the parties' intentions, and other attendant circumstances. These factors must be analyzed holistically, as the language in the agreement alone may not be conclusive.

In *Kehar Singh v. Union of India (1989)*, the Supreme Court emphasized that the President's power under Article 72 operates on a different plane from judicial power. While judicial records remain intact, the President can decide whether to grant relief, such as pardoning or remitting a sentence, based on the case's merits.

This power, exercised in consultation with the Executive under Article 74(1), allows the President to scrutinize evidence and offer relief even after judicial adjudication. However, the reasons for granting such relief are not required to be disclosed to the affected party. Nonetheless, the absence of an obligation to disclose reasons does not exempt the order from being grounded in legitimate or relevant considerations.

The court in *Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014)* reiterated that while the President's act might practically remove the stigma of guilt or remit the sentence, it is a constitutional responsibility distinct from judicial review, upholding the principles of justice and mercy.

The right to lien is a possessory right under Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, allowing bankers and others to retain possession of goods as security for outstanding debts. This right permits banks to act as custodians of the property, provided they do not sell it without prior notice to the borrower.

In *Syndicate Bank v. Vijay Kumar and Others*, the court affirmed that a banker's general lien is a legal right and not merely a contractual provision. The judgment emphasized that the lien and the associated rights stem from established legal principles, as recognized in *Halsbury’s Laws of England*. It confirmed that a banker’s right to lien serves as a safeguard for securing repayment without requiring a specific agreement, reinforcing its customary and legal status.

This legal framework ensures fairness in financial transactions, granting protection to both lenders and borrowers under the law.

In *Bilkis Yakoob Rasul v. Union of India (2024)*, Justice Nagarathna emphasized that liberty must align with the rule of law. Liberty cannot prevail if granted in violation of legal principles. She invoked Plato's curative theory of punishment, highlighting that penalties should aim at reformation and prevention, not vengeance. This perspective underscores that a criminal, if curable, should be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society as a better citizen.

The judgment also addressed competing interests, balancing the victim's right to justice against the convict’s right to remission or reduction of sentence. Justice Nagarathna poignantly questioned whether heinous crimes against women should allow remission, stating that women deserve respect irrespective of their societal standing, faith, or creed.

The judgment reiterated that rule of law is paramount to uphold fundamental rights, including equality under Article 14, ensuring justice and fairness in the justice system.

Section 47 of the Registration Act stipulates that a registered document operates retroactively from the date it would have been effective had registration not been required. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act mandates that the transfer of immovable property worth over Rs. 100 must be executed through a registered instrument.

The Court emphasized that a sale of immovable property requires a duly stamped and registered deed of conveyance to transfer any right, title, or interest. Referring to *Ram Saran Lall v. Domini Kuer*, the Court upheld the balance between Section 54's mandatory requirements and Section 47's deeming fiction. It also noted the distinction under Section 54 between the transfer of property valued above and below Rs. 100. Transfers over Rs. 100 necessitate a registered instrument, while transfers below Rs. 100 may occur through a registered instrument or delivery of property.

The judgment in *Kanwar Raj Singh v. Gejo (2024)* reinforces the procedural and substantive requirements for the lawful transfer of immovable property, ensuring compliance with statutory mandates.

India faces significant environmental challenges that impact vulnerable communities, including forest dwellers. A reliable electricity supply, particularly from renewable sources, is essential for alleviating poverty, improving quality of life, and fostering inclusive growth, especially in rural and underserved areas. The transition to renewable energy is a strategic investment in India’s sustainable future.

The right to a healthy environment, integral to Articles 14 (equality) and 21 (life) of the Constitution, ensures clean and safe living conditions. The Court emphasized that prioritizing environmental protection and renewable energy aligns with scientific consensus on climate change, national and international commitments, and the welfare of current and future generations.

The judgment in *MK Ranjitsinh and Ors v. Union of India (2024)* reinforces the state’s obligation to address climate change, promote sustainability, and uphold the right to a healthy environment as a cornerstone of human well-being and equitable development.

In *M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987)*, the Court highlighted that the law must remain dynamic and adapt to industrialized society's challenges. Relying on foreign legal precedents is not mandatory, as India must develop its jurisprudence tailored to its needs. The Court dismissed the notion that the absence of strict and absolute liability in foreign laws should restrict Indian law from embracing these principles.

Enterprises engaging in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities must adhere to the highest safety standards, ensuring accountability for any harm caused. The Court also reiterated the importance of Epistolary jurisdiction, stating that procedural technicalities must not hinder access to justice. Justice should be accessible to all, and the law should serve as an enabler rather than a barrier.

This case underscores the judiciary's role in shaping laws to ensure safety, justice, and fairness in rapidly changing socio-economic conditions.

Henkin described international organisations as "new laws at its birth," emphasizing their role in shaping international legal systems. The UN Charter and its specialised agencies, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and International Labour Organisation (ILO), have transformed the sources, actors, and processes of international law over the past century.

Since its inception with 51 member states, the UN has grown to include 193 nations, evolving into a diverse global institution committed to upholding world order. Many experts regard the UN as a cornerstone of international law, particularly for its contributions to peace and security. The organisation exemplifies how international bodies act as both creators and custodians of international law, guiding global constitutional principles.

This assessment highlights the pivotal role of international organisations in shaping a cooperative and legally structured global community.

In *Deepak Ananda Patil v. State of Maharashtra (2023)*, the Court emphasized that any material, evidence, or document relied upon in a decision must be disclosed to the party against whom it is used, giving them an opportunity to respond. This principle ensures that no material is relied upon without affording the affected party a fair chance to rebut it.

The Court cited *MP Jain and SN Jain's Principles of Administrative Law*, affirming that undisclosed evidence leads to denial of a real and effective opportunity to defend oneself, vitiating the decision. A quasi-judicial authority must disclose relevant material at the adjudication stage, ensuring compliance with natural justice.

The aggrieved party must also demonstrate prejudice caused by non-disclosure, showing that the outcome or punishment might have been different if the material had been disclosed. This judgment reinforces procedural fairness and transparency in administrative decisions.

The concept of "rights" can be traced back to Aquinas, who linked *ius* (right) with justice and recognized both subjective and objective rights. Subjective rights pertain to an individual's entitlements, while objective rights relate to moral or legal correctness in interpersonal actions.

Hobbes, influenced by positivism, deviated from this tradition by equating rights to liberties in the absence of duties, leading to the notion that individuals possess maximum rights in the state of nature. However, this approach contradicts the interdependence of rights and duties. Without duties, rights lose coherence, as individuals could be subjected to unchecked abuse or destruction without recourse.

Hohfeld’s framework clarifies that rights must correspond to duties. These include claim-rights (correlating with another’s duty), liberties (protected by non-interference), powers (enabled by official recognition of acts), and immunities (shielded from the legal actions of others). This framework reinforces the interconnectedness of rights and duties in a coherent legal and moral order.

In *Pragnesh Shah v. Arunkumar Sharma (2022)*, the Supreme Court recognized that the environmental rule of law provides essential tools to structure environmental governance. It encompasses multi-disciplinary analyses of environmental issues, bridging gaps between science, regulation, and policy to address challenges like carbon footprints, climate change, and habitat destruction.

Unlike traditional legal principles, the environmental rule of law involves all stakeholders—lawyers, judges, policymakers, and scientists—in formulating strategies to combat environmental degradation. It links concepts such as sustainable development and the polluter-pays principle to promote an integrated understanding of the environment’s symbiotic relationships. The interconnectedness of global ecosystems means that environmental changes in one region affect other parts of the world.

The judgment highlights that environmental rule of law seeks to unify responses to global challenges, emphasizing the consequences of actions that transcend local and national boundaries, such as rising sea levels, glacial melting, and desertification. This framework fosters a holistic approach to ensuring the survival of ecosystems and humanity as a whole.

In *Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013)*, the Supreme Court discussed the recognition of live-in relationships and the legal provisions addressing women's rights. The *Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (DV Act)* was the first legislation in India to cover relationships in the nature of marriage, providing civil remedies to prevent domestic violence.

Other legislations, such as Section 125 Cr.P.C. (maintenance of destitute wives), Section 498-A IPC (mental cruelty), and Section 304-B IPC (dowry death), alongside the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, address specific challenges faced by women. These laws aim to protect women's rights within formal marriages and vulnerable situations.

The Court emphasized that determining whether a relationship qualifies as "in the nature of marriage" under Section 2(f) of the DV Act requires a detailed analysis of the relationship's facts and circumstances. Factors like mutual commitment, cohabitation, and shared responsibilities play a critical role in this judicial assessment.

Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) enable the State to make provisions for socially and educationally backward classes or Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). Sub-classification within a class must be reasonable and ensure opportunities for all categories while adhering to the principle of substantive equality.

In *The State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2024)*, Justice Bela Trivedi dissented, emphasizing that sub-classification of SCs under the Presidential List (Article 341) by States is impermissible. She argued that the list can only be amended by Parliament, and sub-classification by States would violate the object of Article 341, risking political influence and unequal treatment.

Justice Trivedi upheld the decision in *E.V. Chinnaiah*, reiterating that affirmative action must respect constitutional boundaries. Preferential treatment for a sub-class within the Presidential List would deprive other SCs of their benefits, amounting to a colorable exercise of power. The decision reinforces the importance of adhering to plain and literal interpretation of constitutional provisions, ensuring fairness and consistency in affirmative action policies.

In *Managing Director, Kerala Tourism Development Corporation Limited v. Deepti Singh (2019)*, the Supreme Court outlined that negligence requires a legal duty to take care, a breach of that duty, and resulting damage. The court referred to *Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman (1990)* to establish that duty depends on foreseeability of damage, the proximity of the relationship, and whether imposing the duty is just and reasonable.

Breach of duty involves assessing whether the defendant’s conduct fell below the standard expected of a reasonable person. Determining negligence entails three steps: identifying the standard of care expected in the given circumstances, considering relevant factors, and evaluating whether the defendant's actions were less careful than those of a reasonable person.

The court emphasized that the division of negligence into duty, breach, and damage is helpful for explanation but often overlaps. Negligence as a tort aims to determine if the type of loss suffered by the plaintiff is actionable and whether the defendant failed to act with the required care.

Justice Ahmadi, speaking for himself and Justice Punchhi, noted that sufficient time had passed since the establishment of tribunals under various statutes, and it was essential to evaluate whether they had achieved their objectives. Complaints about their functioning necessitate a comprehensive review by the Law Commission of India to recommend measures for improving their performance and independence.

The Court stressed the importance of creating a model for the constitution or reconstitution of tribunals to bolster public confidence in their impartiality and efficiency. It highlighted the ineffectiveness of the current alternative mechanisms for judicial review, affirming that judicial review and remedy are fundamental rights of citizens. The Court expressed concern over the quality of justice dispensed by tribunals and urged improvements to meet public expectations and constitutional standards.

In *Moser Baer Karamchari Union v. Union of India (2023)*, the Supreme Court clarified that the Companies Act and the IBC serve different purposes. While Section 271 of the Companies Act allows the winding up of companies, including financially sound ones, for specific statutory reasons, the IBC focuses on reviving or winding up companies unable to pay debts.

The Court emphasized that sacrifices from various stakeholders, including workmen and secured creditors, are essential for the revival of insolvent companies. Such sacrifices must not be deemed unconstitutional unless they are manifestly unjust or arbitrary.

Rejecting arguments of discrimination under Article 14 or violation of Article 21, the Court observed that the objectives and purposes of the Companies Act and the IBC are fundamentally different. Examining the waterfall mechanism in either enactment in isolation would not adequately address the unique contexts of each law.

In *Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu (2008)*, the Supreme Court emphasized that custody decisions require a humane approach, focusing on the child’s welfare above legalistic interpretations. Factors such as the child’s comfort, education, health, and moral values are considered crucial.

Similarly, in *Gaurav Nagpal v. Semedha Nagpal (2009)*, the Court highlighted the importance of moral and ethical values, placing them on par with physical comforts in determining the child's welfare. The child's preferences, if they are mature enough to form an intelligent opinion, must also be taken into account, though the final decision lies with the Court.

The Court observed that when parents present conflicting custody claims, human considerations are paramount. Custody is not merely a legal issue but a matter requiring sensitivity to the child’s overall well-being, including their moral and ethical upbringing.